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ABSTRACT

EVALUATION OF INTRUSION DETECTION
SYSTEMS WITH AUTOMATIC TRAFFIC
GENERATION PROGRAMS
by
Friday Bassey Akpan

In this master's thesis work, a program was developed using the Pearl programming
language to enable user defined attack programs to run automatically. A similar program
was also developed for background traffic. With this program, the different features of
the Nmap exploration and scanning tool were exploited to build scenarios of attacks.
Automated scenarios of attacks running in to the order of hundreds were
developed. Also, different sets of automated stealthy attacks scenarios running in to the
order of hundreds were developed using the timing modes, stealthy scans and scan delay
features of Nmap.
These automated attacks scenarios were employed in the evaluation of the Snort
intrusion detection system. It was discovered that 73% of all the Nmap's scanning types
and discovery methods that were used in this work resulted in scanning activity. The
Snort intrusion detection system detected and produced alerts on every of the 73%
Nmap's scan types and discovery method that resulted in scanning activity. Snort was
found to have a non-existent false alarm rate and a very high detection rate of 100% using
these attacks scenarios and background traffic.
The developed attacks scenarios program were found to be easy to use, efficient,
and easy to expand by setting only the type of attacks, parameters of the attack, and the
delay time between two successive attacks in a configuration file.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This report is an account of a master's thesis work aimed at evaluating the Snort intrusion
detection system with automatic traffic generation programs.
In order to have a number of attack programs, a program was developed using the
Pearl programming language. This program enables user defined attack programs to run
automatically. With this program scenarios of attacks running in to the order of hundreds
were developed. Similarly, scenarios of stealthy attacks running into the order of
hundreds were also generated using the stealth scan types, timing modes, and scan delay
features of Nmap. A number of manually administered attack programs were also used in
this work.
A similar scenario program was also developed using the Perl programming
language in order to have a number of background traffic necessary for the evaluation of
the intrusion detection system.
The Snort intrusion detection system was evaluated using the automated attack
scenarios and background traffic. The parameters that were measured are the detection
rate and false alarm rate of Snort. The automated scenarios of attacks and background
traffic, and other manually administered attack application programs were employed to
measure these parameters for the system. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) of
Snort was also investigated.
Fusion system is discussed as an area for further work. Some approaches that
have been used in designing fusion systems are also presented. Fusion systems aim at
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combining scenarios of alerts produced from different intrusion detection systems
sensors, and report these scenarios of alerts at a single easily monitored location.
The remaining part of this report is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, the scope
of this project work and the organization of this report are presented. In Chapter 2,
computer and network attacks and countermeasures are discussed. In Chapter 3, the
layout of the intrusion detection system network and the different programs that were
used in this work are presented. In Chapter 4, a concise account of Snort and some
measured quantities are given. In Chapter 5, the attack programs that were used in this
work are discussed. In Chapter 6, the attack scenarios planning and development process
is outlined. In Chapter 7, the background traffic planning and development process is
presented. In Chapter 8, approaches adopted in the design of data fusion systems are
discussed. In Chapter 9, the process of conducting the attacks, running the background
traffic and collecting all the necessary data is outlined. In Chapter 10, the attack results
are presented and discussed, conclusions are drawn, and areas where further work is
necessary are presented. Appendices and References are presented after Chapter 10.

CHAPTER 2
COMPUTER AND NETWORK ATTACKS
AND COUNTERMEASURES
The proliferation of the Internet and the application of computers and computer networks
in many and diverse sensitive transactions have resulted in great security concerns given
all the possible attacks on the security of a computer system or network. Computer
attacks and their classes are discussed in [19][2][24-25]. These attacks could result in the
interruption of services or systems, or complete denial of service, interception of data
and/or modification of data.
Devising and effecting countermeasures against attacks on computers and
networks is an ongoing task that requires a great deal of effort. Countermeasures against
attacks on computers and networks have evolved over the years to include cryptographic
algorithms and protocols underlying network security applications (like encryption, hash
functions, digital signatures, and key exchange), network security tools and applications
(like Kerberos, X.509v3 certificates, PGP, S/MIME, IP Security, SSL/TLS, SET, and
SNMPv3), and system-level security issues (like the threats of and countermeasures for
intruders and viruses, and the use of firewalls and trusted systems). Cryptography,
Network Security Applications and System Security are discussed in [14].
Intrusion detection system is at the system-level of computer and network
security. Intrusion detection systems detect intrusions into a network or system abuse
using information the intrusion detection systems gather from the computer or network.
There are quite a number of intrusion detection systems developed using different
approaches. Some of these systems are discussed in [7][20-23][26].
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CHAPTER 3
THE INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
NETWORK AND PROGRAMS

In this Chapter, the intrusion detection system network and the different programs that
were used in the course of this work are discussed.
3.1 The Network
The intrusion detection system network at the New Jersey Institute of Technology (NJIT)
is built primarily for project work on intrusion detection systems. The network is
independent of the NJIT campus network, and it is not connected to the Internet. A
detailed layout of the network is shown in Figure 3.1 below.
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The network layout as shown in Figure 3.1 above comprises four network
segments. The division of each of these networks terminates into a layer 2/3 switch.
These switches provide the routing functionality needed for communication from one
network segment to another. The network comprises four network segments with the
following address spaces:
(1) Traffic ULAN #1 with address space 10.10.10.0/24
(2) System/Uictim ULAN #2 with address space 172.16.2.0/24
(3) Wireless ULAN #3 with address space 20.20.20.0/24
(4) Attack ULAN with address space 30.30.30.0/24
The site built is designed to enable traffic to be generated across the
system/victim network from the traffic network, and the attack network performing
various attacks. Each of these networks is discussed in turn in the following sections.

3.1.1 The Traffic Network — VLAN #1
The traffic segment of the intrusion detection system network was set up to allow random
patterns of predetermined background traffic across the system/victim network. The
protocols used for the background traffic include Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP —
Web), File Transfer Protocol (FTP — File Transfer), and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
(SMTP — Mail). Some client — server background traffic have also been generated using
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP).
The network address assignment is as follows:

Table 3.1 below gives a breakdown of the assigned usable IP address range and
their corresponding host names.

3.1.2 The System/Victim Network —VLAN #2
The System/Uictim segment of the intrusion detection system network was set up to
allow receipt of random patterns of predetermined traffic from both the traffic network,
and from devices residing directly within the System/Uictim network. The same
protocols as in the Traffic network apply for the System/Victim network. They are:
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP —Web), File Transfer Protocol (FTP — File Transfer),
and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP — Mail). Some client — server background
traffic have also been generated using Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User
Datagram Protocol (UDP).
The range of IP addresses allocated to the System/Uictim network is assigned as
follows:

7

3.1.3 The Wireless Network VLAN #3

The Wireless segment of the intrusion detection system network was added to allow for
intrusion detection experiment with wireless technology. Generally, wireless
communication can be effected by either one of two modes of operation. These modes of
operation are:
(1) The infrastructure mode of operation which involves the use of an access point
connected to the wired network, and
(2) The infrastructure-less mode of operation otherwise called the ad-hoc mode of
operation because an access point is not involved. In this case, the hosts (Lap
Tops) communicate directly on a peer-to-peer basis.
The address space allocated to the Wireless network is assigned as follows:
20.20.20.0

-

Network Address
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3.1.4 The Attack Network VLAN #4
The attack segment was designed to allow different types of attacks including random
patterns to be launched. These attacks could take a number of forms including:
-

Probing

-

Denial of Service (DOS)

-

Local-to-Root

-

Remote-to-Local

-

Any combination of the above

The network address range allocated to the Attack network is assigned as follows:

.....

Table 3.4 below gives a breakdown of the assigned usable IP address range and
their corresponding host names.

3.2 Network Programs
A number of network utility programs were installed in the different network segment of
the intrusion detection network to allow for a number of functions including capturing of
packets, collection of tcpdump files and analysis of tcpdump files. These programs
include Windump and the Ethereal Network Analyzer. Both the Windump and Ethereal
Network Analyzer programs were installed on the Attack and System/Uictim networks.
Each of these programs is discussed in turn below.

3.2.1 Windump
Windump [11] is the tcpduinp version for the Windows operating system. It is a packet
sniffer and analyzer.
The Windump program was installed on both the attack and sniffer machines, and
was used to collect attack and victim tcpdump files on the respective machines.
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3.2.2 Ethereal Network Analyzer
Ethereal [12} is a network protocol analyzer for both Unix and Windows operating
systems. It has the capability to analyze data from a live network or captured data on file
on a disk. With Ethereal, summary and detailed information for each packet can be
examined. The Ethereal Network Analyzer program has a number of features including a
display filter that allows users to select display preferences.
The Ethereal Network Analyzer program was installed on both the attack and
sniffer systems, and was used to examine and analyze tcpduinp files recorded both at the
attack and victim machines during the different test sessions.

CHAPTER 4
SNORT INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
AND MEASURED QUANTITIES

Intrusion detection systems have become an important part of many network security
architectures. Generally speaking, intrusion detection systems monitor the networks on
which they are deployed for suspicious activity or predetermined patterns. Most network
intrusion detection systems are equipped with the capability of alerting and logging these
information, while a very few have real-time capability of taking corrective measures.
In this work, one network intrusion detection system, Snort was considered. A
detailed discussion of this system is presented next.

4.1 Snort
Snort [7] is a packet sniffer and logger with real time alerting capability. It is rules-based,
can perform content pattern matching, and detect a variety of attacks and probes, such as
buffer overflows, stealth port scans, CGI attacks, SMB probes, and much more, and has
been used as an intrusion detection system. Snort performs payload inspection and can
filter traffic depending on the given command line instructions.
Snort is made up of three primary subsystems. These subsystems are: the packet
decoder, the detection engine, and the logging and alerting systems. The decode engine is
built around the supported data-link and TCP/IP protocol definitions. The supported datalink protocols are Ethernet, SLIP, and raw (PPP). The detection engine maintains Snort's
detection rules in a two dimensional linked list, termed Chain Headers and Chain Options.
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Snort's logging and alerting subsystems options are selected at run time with command
line switches. Figure 4.1 below is an example of Snort's alert output.

Figure 4.1 An example of Snort's Alert output.
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4.2 Performance Measures

In determining the performance of the intrusion detection system, two performance
measures were employed. These are the false alarm rate and detection rate. These
measures are discussed next.
4.2.1 False Alarm Rate

False alarm rate is a measure of how many alarms (false) were generated for normal
traffic monitored over a specified period of time, say a day — twenty-four hours period.
Background traffic of different types was employed in determining this performance
measure for the Snort intrusion detection system.
4.2.2 Detection Rate

Detection rate measures the percentage of all attacks detected by a particular intrusion
detection system. To determine this performance measure for Snort, a number of attacks
types were used.
4.2.3 Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)

The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is a plot of the percentage correct
attacks detected by an intrusion detection system versus the number of false alarms per
day produced by the system. This performance measure provides a means of evaluating
the trade off between the detection rate and the false alarm rate. Low false alarm rates
with high detection rates means that the detection output can be relied upon. Conversely,
relatively high false alarm rate with low detection rate means that the detection output
can not be believed, and much more work will be needed as security analysts would be
spending more hours dismissing false alarms.

CHAPTER 5
ATTACK PROGRAMS
A number of attack programs were considered in the course of this work. Some of these
attack programs were automated by utilizing them in building scripts of attack scenarios
using the Pert programming language. Some other types of attack programs that could not
be automated due to their nature were administered manually. These attack programs are
discussed in the following sections.

5.1 Nmap
Nmap [10] ("Network Mapper") is one of the attack programs that were utilized in
building scripts of attack scenarios using the Pen programming language. The Nmap
program is designed to scan large networks rapidly. It employs raw IP packets to
determine information on what hosts are available on the network, what services (ports)
they are offering, what type of packet filters/firewalls are in use, what operating system
(and OS version) they are running, and other characteristics.
Nmap program provides a number of scan types, discovery methods, and options.
The scan types provided by Nmap include: TCP connect() scan, TCP SYN scan, Stealth
FIN, Xmas Tree, or Null scan modes, Ping scanning, UDP scans, IP protocol scans, ACK
scan, Window Scan, RPC scan and List scan. The discovery methods provided by Nmap
include: using TCP Ping, using TCP + ICMP, using ICMP Ping, or using the Don't Ping
method. The different options provided by the Nmap program include: Fragmentation,
Get Identification Information, Resolve All, Don't Resolve, Fast Scan, Operating System
(OS) Detection, Random Host, and Resume. The program also provides variation in
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timing. The timing modes include Paranoid, Sneaky, Polite, Normal, Aggressive, and
Insane.
Each of these scan types, discovery methods, options and variations in timing are
discussed below.

5.1.1 Nmap Scan Modes
In this section, a concise description of the different scan types is presented.

5.1.1.1 SYN.

SYN scan works by sending SYN packet as though a real

connection was to be opened, and then waits for a response. A SYN/ACK is indicative
that the port is listening while a RST is indicative of a non-listener. Where a SYN/ACK
is received, a RST is sent to tear down the connection.

5.1.1.2 FIN. This Nmap scan type uses a bare FIN packet as the probe. The idea is to
make scanning as clandestine as possible.

5.1.1.3 PING SWEEP.

This Nmap scan type is useful in cases where all the

information that is needed is which hosts on a network are up. It uses ICMP echo
requests packets.

5.1.1.4 UDP SCAN.

When performing UDP scans, Nmap sends 0 byte udp

packets to each port on the target machine(s) to determine which UDP ports are open on
the host(s).

5.1.1.5 NULL SCAN.

Null scan has the same objective as FIN scan. It turns off

all the flags.

5.1.1.6 XMAS TREE.

The Xmas Tree scan type has the same objective as FIN

scan, but it turns on the FIN, URG, and PUSH flags on.
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5.1.1.7 IP PROTOCOL SCAN. The IP protocol scans in Nmap sends raw IP
packets without any further protocol header to each specified protocol on the target
machine in order to determine which IP protocols are supported on a host. Whether or not
a particular protocol is used is determined by the kind of message that is received. An
ICMP protocol unreachable message means the protocol is not in use.
5.1.1.8 ACK SCAN.

ACK scan is usually used to map out firewall rulesets. It

works by sending an ACK packet to specified ports and waiting for RSTs. If a RST
comes back, then the port is not filtered, but if nothing comes back (or if an ICMP
unreachable is received), then the port is filtered.
5.1.1.9 WINDOW SCAN. This type of Nmap scan is similar to ACK scan, and can
detect open ports as well as filtered and non-filtered ports.
5.1.1.10 RCP SCAN.

RCP scan determines which ports are RCP ports by

flooding all TCP/UDP ports that have been found open with SunRPC program null
commands.
5.1.1.11 LIST SCAN.

List scan in Nmap generates and prints a list of IP

addresses and names. In doing this, Nmap does not perform any pinging or port scanning.
5.1.1.12 CONNECT. This Nmap scan type employs the connect() system call to
open a connection to interesting ports on the machine. The connection operation will
succeed if the port is listening. Otherwise it will not succeed.

5.1.2 Nmap Discovery Methods
In this section, the different Nmap discovery methods are discussed.
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5.1.2.1 TCP Ping. In this Nmap discovery method, TCP "ping" is used to determine
what hosts are up in a network. It employs TCP ACK packets. These packets are sent into
the network or to a single host. Hosts that are up will respond with a RST.
5.1.2.2 TCP + ICMP.

This discovery method combines the TCP ping and ICMP

discovery methods.
5.1.2.3 ICMP Ping. This discovery method uses ICMP echo request packets and waits
for the corresponding echo reply packets.
5.1.2.4 Don't Ping. This discovery method allows for the scanning of networks that do
not allow ICMP echo requests (or responses), may be, through their firewall. The idea is
to attempt scanning without pinging host systems.

5.1.3 Nmap General Options
In this section, the different options provided by the Nmap program are discussed.
5.1.3.1 Fragmentation.

This enable Nmap to cause the requested scan to use tiny IP

packets. The idea is to prevent network-protecting systems to detect the actions taken
against the network.
5.1.3.2 Get Identification Information. This option enables Nmap to identify the
hosts on the network.
5.1.3.3 Resolve All. This option tells Nmap to do reverse DNS resolution on the active
IP addresses it finds.
5.1.3.4 Don't Resolve.

This option tells Nmap never to do reverse DNS resolution.

The objective here may be to speed up the scanning process.
5.1.3.5 Fast Scan. This causes Nmap to scan only those ports listed in the services file
that comes with Nmap.
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5.1.3.6 Operating System (OS) Detection. This option enables Nmap to use a
number of techniques to detect useful information about the underlying system being
scanned. This information is then used to create a 'fingerprint' which it compares with its
database of known OS fingerprints. With this, it proceeds to guess the operating system.
5.1.3.7 Random Host. This option tells Nmap to shuffle a group of up to 2048
hosts before it scans them.
5.1.3.8 Resume. This option enables Nmap scanning session that is cancelled due to
control-C, network outage, etc. to be resumed.

5.1.4 Nmap Timing Modes
Nmap has a number of timing modes designed to meet the objective of the user. These
timing modes are discussed below. Also, the particular timing modes that were used in
developing the stealth attacks scenarios are mentioned in the respective sections.

5.1.4.1 Paranoid. This Nmap timing mode scans very slowly in the hope of avoiding
detection by intrusion detection systems. It serializes all scans. In other words, under this
timing mode, Nmap does not perform parallel scanning. Also, in this mode, Nmap
generally waits at least five (5) minutes between sending packets.
The command option for this timing mode is "0." This is shown in the
sce_exp.conf file in Appendix H — stealth attacks scenarios configuration files. This
timing mode was used for the first eighty five (85) attacks scenarios, with large scanning
time delay between individual attacks scenarios.

5.1.4.2 Sneaky. This Nmap timing mode is similar to Paranoid. The only difference
here is that the waiting time between sending packets is 15 seconds (not 5 minutes).
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The command option for this timing mode is "1." This timing mode was used for
the eighty sixth to one hundred and seventieth (86-170) attacks scenarios after the
paranoid mode, and also with somewhat large scanning delay time (lesser than for 1 - 85)
between individual attacks scenarios. The part of the configuration file, sce_exp.conf file,
corresponding to the stealth attacks scenarios developed using this timing mode cannot be
shown due to space constraint.

5.1.4.3 Polite.

This Nmap timing option is designed to ease load on the network

and reduces the chances of crashing machines. It serializes the probes and waits at least
0.4 seconds between the packets being sent.
The command option for this timing mode is "2." This timing mode was used for
the remaining attacks scenarios, and with even lesser scanning delay time between
individual attacks scenarios. The part of the configuration file, sce_exp.conf file,
corresponding to the stealth attacks scenarios developed using this timing mode cannot be
shown due to space constraint.
5.1.4.4 Normal.

This Nmap timing option causes the Nmap program to run as fast

as possible without overloading the network or missing hosts/ports. This is the default
Nmap behavior.
The option for this timing mode is "3." Many of the attacks scenarios in the
normal attacks scenarios script as shown in Appendix F employed this timing mode.
5.1.4.5 Aggressive. This Nmap timing mode adds a 5 minutes timeout per host. Under
this mode, Nmap does not wait more than 1.25 seconds for probe responses. This timing
mode was used in the normal attacks scenarios script shown in Appendix F. The
command option for this timing mode is "4."
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5.1.4.6 Insane. This Nmap timing mode is only suitable for very fast networks or
where capturing every piece of information is really not important. This mode times out
in 75 seconds and only waits 0.3 seconds for individual probes. The command option for
this timing mode is "5."

5.2 Netcat Program
Netcat, or "nc" [9] as the actual program is named, is another form of attack program.
However, it was not used in this work. Netcat can create almost any kind of connection
that one would need. It can be used directly or easily driven by other programs and
scripts.
In its simplest usage, Netcat creates a TCP connection to the given port on the
given target host. The standard input is then sent to the host, and anything that comes
back across the connection is sent to the standard output.
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5.3 Other Attack Programs
Many other kinds of attack programs were also used in this work. These are presented in
Table 5.1 below.

CHAPTER 6
ATTACK SCENARIOS

A number of attack scenarios running into the order of hundreds were developed in the
course of this work for use in the evaluation of the Snort intrusion detection system. The
development of these attack scenarios represents efforts at automating many of the attack
types on the one hand, and administering these many and diverse attack types and options
in a coordinated manner and much more conveniently, on the other. In this chapter, the
attack scenarios planning and development processes are discussed.
6.1 Attack Scenarios Planning

The different attack scenarios were built from the different attack types under each kind
of attack, different discovery methods, different attack options, and different timing
options for each attack type as discussed in Chapter 5. Additionally, there were different
combinations of these attacks, and the scan interval between them.

6.2 Attack Scenarios Development

The attack scenarios were developed using the Pearl programming language with the
ultimate purpose of being able to run user-defined attack programs automatically. Perl is
portable. It can be used on many platforms including Unix, Linux and Windows.
The Pearl programs were developed with the intent that generating attack scenarios
be fairly easy by setting only the attack types, parameters and delay time between two
attacks in a configuration file. The program is developed in two steps characterizing
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typical attacker behavior. The first step involves information gathering, and the second
step involves some specific exploits based on the information gathered in the first step.

6.2.1 Information Gathering
The information-gathering step represents the first step in simulating a sequence of
intrusion action in this work. Since an attacker often starts with discovery attacks to
obtain important information about a victim's network, this first step of the program was
developed solely for the purpose of gathering information about the victim's network.
Such information may include: which hosts (or IPA addresses) are running, what port
numbers are open, and what services are running on these ports.
Two files were developed in this step. One is a configuration file, and the other is
a Pearl script. The configuration file, pre_exp. conf and the Pearl script, pre_exp are given
in Appendix E.
When the Perl script is being executed, it calls the configuration file, and parse
configuration information. The configuration information includes the victim network
address (or address range) and which services to detect and other parameters. When the
Perl script finishes scanning the victim network, it saves the result in a database called
pre_exp.data. Each line of the database file contains the information of one running host.
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A typical content of the pre_exp.data database for our network for the
information gathering stage is shown below.

Figure 6.1 Content of pre_exp.data database.
6.2.2 Attack Exploit

The attack exploit represents the second step in the simulation of intrusion action in this
work. In this step, there are two configuration files and one Perl script. The configuration
files are sce_cmd.conf and sce_exp.conf, and the Pearl script is sce_exp.pl. The files in
this step, both the configuration files and the Pearl script, are given in Appendix F. Each of
the configuration files and the Perl script are discussed in the following sections.
6.2.2.1 sce_cmd.conf.

The configuration file, sce_cind.conf, specifies each attack

program and its parameters. The first column in this file is the entry name. The second
column is the attack program name, and the other columns are its parameters' format.
New attack types are added to the program by defining its format in the scecmd. conf configuration file.
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6.2.2.1 sce_exp.conf. The configuration file, sce_exp.conf, is the file where

attack scenarios are specified. Each line in this file is a kind of known attack. The
sce_cmd. conf and sce_cmd. conf configuration files together define a particular attack to

be carried out when the Pearl script is executed.
For each attack to be carried out, and as defined in the sce_cmd. conf configuration
file, there are typically three entries that are defined in this configuration file —
sce_cmd.conf The first entry is the waiting time between two attack commands. This is

represented as < n >s, < n >m or < n >h to indicate number of seconds, minutes or hours.
The < n > represents a number. The second entry is the command to build the database.
This command is represented by newdata on a separate line. The command, newdata,
calls the configuration file pre_exp.pl each time it is executed to scan the network again
in order the build the database. The third and final entry is the attack command line. The
attack command line represents an attack command and its parameters, with the space
character separating them. The first column in the command line of the sce_exp.conf
configuration file is the same entry name of an attack specified in sce_xp.onf
configuration file. With this, the Peril script upon reaching a new (and unique) attack
name, uses the information contained in the two configuration files to construct the attack
command, and then, executes it.
6.2.3 Stealth Attacks Scenarios

Stealthiness in attacks scenarios building has to do with hiding an attack action from an
individual monitoring the system or network, or from an intrusion detection system. The
methods for making attacks stealthy depend on the type of attack.
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The Nmap program used in this used is basically a surveillance/probing form of
attack. For this form of attack, a number of methods have been identified for either hiding
the fact that a probe is occurring, or hiding the identity of the attacker. One of the
simplest ways to hide probing actions is to make the probe to occur slowly. For the Nmap
program, the timing options — paranoid and sneaky — provide for this occurrence. These
timing options were used to build a large number of attacks scenarios for the stealthy
attacks script.
Another method to hide probing actions is to use scan delays. The scan delay
option in Nmap specifies the amount of time Nmap must wait between probes. In
addition to slowing the scan way down as to sneak under intrusion detection system's
thresholds, scan delay can also be useful in reducing the load on the network. This
method was also used in building the stealth attacks scenarios.
Yet another method to hide probing actions is to employ scan types that are
inherently designed for this purpose. Such scan types do half-open connections or FIN
scanning of a network. The Nmap program provides two of such scan modes. These are
the SYN stealth and the FIN stealth scan attack types. The SYN stealth scan works by
sending SYN packet as though a real connection was to be opened, and then waits for a
response. A SYN/ACK is indicative that the port is listening while a RST is indicative of
a non-listener. Where a SYN/ACK is received, a RST is sent to tear down the connection.
The FIN stealth scan attack type on the other hand uses a bare FIN packet as the probe.
Relative to the SYN stealth scan type, the idea in this case is to make scanning as
clandestine as possible. The SYN stealth scan type was also used to develop some stealth
attacks scenarios.

CHAPTER 7
BACKGROUND TRAFFIC

Background traffic emanating from the traffic network of the intrusion detection system
network was used each time attacks were performed and data were being collected.
Generally speaking, four kinds of background traffic namely file transfer protocol (FTP),
telnet, hyper-text transfer protocol (HTTP), and Mail services are available for work of
this nature. These four kinds of traffic are discussed in [13].
7.1 Background Traffic Scenarios Planning

The background traffic scenarios was planned around the available background traffic
types - file transfer protocol (FTP), telnet, hyper-text transfer protocol (HTTP), and Mail
services.
7.2 Background Traffic Scenarios Development

A background traffic-generating program was developed using the Pearl programming
language. This program generates user-defined background traffic automatically. The
program contains three files: bkgrd_gen.conf, bkgrd gen.conf, and bkgrdgen.pl. The
file structure of this background traffic-generating program is similar to that of the
attacks scenarios building program. The bkgrd_cmd.conf configuration file defines the
format of each background traffic type, the bkgrd_cmd.conf configuration file contains
various background traffics to be generated, and bkgrdgen.pl is the script reading the
configuration information in bkgrd_cmd.conf and generating the background traffic.
These scripts are shown in Appendix G.
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CHAPTER 8
FUSION SYSTEM

As intrusion detection systems are becoming more and more in common use in
organizations, the trend is moving towards the use of multiple intrusion sensors. A
consequence of this practice is that the work load of security personnel may increase as
the same attacks may be detected and reported by different sensors. Additionally, while
the detection rate is improved, the false alarm rate tends to increase.
Fusion systems are designed to overcome these issues by combining the alerts
generated by the different sensors and reporting the results at a single location. This is an
ongoing area of research work, and a number of approaches have been adopted in
combining the alerts.
The algorithm described in [28] is probabilistic in nature. It determines the
scenario membership of a new alert in time proportional to the number of candidate
scenarios. In essence, it groups alerts that share a common cause.
In [29], an approach to construct attack scenarios by correlating alerts on the basis
of prerequisites and consequences of intrusions. Based on the prerequisites and
consequences of different types of attacks, the proposed approach correlates alerts by
(partially) matching the consequence of some previous alerts and the prerequisites of
some later ones.
The alerts obtained from the Snort intrusion detection system when the different
attacks scenarios in this work were executed have been made available for the next phase
of this work — building the alerts scenarios.

28

CHAPTER 9
CONDUCTING ATTACKS AND
COLLECTING DATA

All the attack programs were conducted from the attack network. The different
background traffics were sent into the network from the traffic network. The sniffer
system is installed in the systemlvictim network from where data on the network is
dumped. All the attacks were performed in the presence of background traffic.
In measuring the detection rate of Snort, all the automated attack scenarios and
manually administered attack programs were used in the presence of background traffic.
In determining the false alarm rate of Snort, only background traffics were used.
Appendix A shows the false alarm rate tests schedule for Snort intrusion detection
system. Appendix B shows the tests schedule for the determining the detection rate of
Snort using the Nmap programs. Appendix C shows the tests schedule for determining
the detection rate of Snort using the manual attack application programs. Appendix D
shows the tests schedule for determining the detection rate for Snort using the attack
scenarios.
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CHAPTER 10
RESULTS AND FUTURE WORK

In this Chapter, result from the different attack performed and the different background
traffic ran independently is presented. Also, in this Chapter, a discussion of the results
obtained, conclusions drawn, and areas for future work are presented.
10.1 Attacks Results Summary

In the discussion of these results, reference is made to Appendices A — D showing the
results and the tests schedule for all the tests that were carried out.
Table 10.1 shown below summarizes the number of Nmap attack programs that
were detected by the Snort intrusion detection system. It shows similar figures for the
manually administered attack application programs.
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Table 10.2 summarizes the number of false alarms generated by the Snort intrusion
detection system when the different background traffic were present on the network.

The result presented in Table 10.1 above indicates that 73% all Nmap's scan types
and discovery method used in this work resulted in actual scanning of the network. Of the
73% Nmap attacks that resulted in scanning activity, the Snort intrusion detection system
detected all (100%) of them.
For the false alarm rate performance, the Snort intrusion detection system
produced no false alarms for the background traffic used.
The receiver operating characteristic curve for Snort intrusion detection system
will show a 100% detection rate for the Nmap attack programs with 0% false alarm rate.
These results are discussed below.
10.2 Discussion of Results

As seen in Appendix B, from the breakdown of all Nmap's scanning attacks performed
with different discovery options, it was discovered that there were no alerts produced by
the Snort intrusion detection system for any of the scan types when the ICMP discovery
options is used. In the following sections, the Snort alerts collected and the scan results
for a selected number of the scenarios are presented and discussed.
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In the other cases (like all the LIST SCAN types with different discovery methods,
PING SWEEP with TCP Ping discovery method) where there were no alerts produced,
there were also no scanning activity. The scanning results for these attacks scenarios are
shown in Figure 10.8, Figure 10.9, and Figure 10.10 below.
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10.3 Conclusions
It is evident from the above results that the Snort intrusion detection system is capable of
detectinglalerting on all Nmap scanning types and discovery option where scanning
activity is actually carried out for a 100% detection rate. Also, Snort does not produce
any false alarms for the background traffic we used.
It is also evident from the results that Nmap under the Windows operating system
does not scan the network for all of Nmap scan types when the ICMP Ping discovery
method is used. One explanation for this is the fact that the network under the Windows
operating system does not allow ICMP echo requests (or responses) packets. This is
evident in the blocking of probes when this command option is used.
Also, Nmap under List Scan does not perform scanning activity. This is evident
from the results obtained. Nmap documentation explains that the List Scan simply list the
IP addresseslNames on hosts on the network without actually scanning them.
About 73% of all the Nmap scan types and discovery methods investigated in this
work resulted in scanning activity.
The Pearl script developed in this work is easy to expand, portable and efficient.

10.4 Future Work
The next step planned for this work is fusion system. As discussed in Chapter 8, fusion
systems build scenarios of alerts into groups, and determine the scenario membership of a
new alert given the alerts and the groups already present, based on probability
calculations or correlation techniques. The different Snort alerts collected in the process
of running the many different attacks scenarios in the course of this work have been made
available for this purpose.

APPENDIX A
SNORT INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
FALSE ALARM RATE TESTS SCHEDULE

In this Appendix, false alarm rate tests schedule is presented.
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APPENDIX B
SNORT INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM DETECTION
RATE USING NMAP PROGRAMS TESTS SCHEDULE

In this Appendix, detection rate tests schedule is presented.

APPENDIX C
SNORT INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
DETECTION RATE USING MANUAL ATTACK
PROGRAMS TESTS SCHEDULE

In this Appendix, the tests schedule for determining the detection rate of Snort using the
Manual Application Programs is presented.
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APPENDIX D
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
DETECTION RATE USING THE DIFFERENT
ATTACK SCENARIOS TESTS SCHEDULE
In this Appendix, the tests schedule that was followed in determining the detection rate of
the Snort intrusion detection system using the attack scenarios is presented.

40

41

42

43

44

45

printf FP_OUT ("Test UDP port: \"@cmd <IP> -p $PRE_EXP_DPORT_UDP -sUV\" on
%02d1%02d1%02c1 %02d:%02d:%02d\n", $mon+1, $mday, $year%100, $hour, $min,
$sec);
#print FP_OUT "Test TCP port: \"@cmd <IP> -p $PRE_EXP_DPORT_TCP\" on ",
'date +\"%a %D %T\"';
#print FP_OUT "Test UDP port: \"@cmd <IP> -p $PRE_EXP_DPORT_UDP -nth" on ",
'date +\"%a %D %T\"';
close(FP_OUT);
close(FP_OUT);
unlink("pre_exp.data.tmp") 11 warn "warning on deleting file: $!";
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elsif ($line — lA\s*newdata*$l) {
print "updating database";
do "pre_exp.p1";
}
# it's a attack command
else {
@cmd=""; $repetition = 1;
process_parameter;
# remove the first "".
shift(@cmd);
#print "cad: @cmd\n";
#print "repetition: $repetition\n";

if(!defined($child_pid=fork())) {
die "Cannot fork another process to run the scenarios: $ r
}
# this is child process
elsif ($child_pid = 0) {
print "command: @cmd\n";
#system("cmd");
$tmp_repetition = $repetition;
while (--$repetition\n > 0) {
@cmd=""•
process_parameter;
shift(@cmd); # remove the first "".
print "command: @cmd\n";
#system(" @cmd");
}

;

exit;
}
else {
#wait;
}
}
}

# this is parent process.

close(FPCONF);
+
#
# construct a hash from the database: key IP, value port I
+
#
sub read_database {
# need parentheses.
my ($line, @tmp_lv);
open (FP_PRE,"pre_exp.data") or die "Cannot open pre-scann data file: $!";
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llADR$/ ? $tmp_hv $tmpip1 [0] ? func_dr(split(As+l,$tmp_hv {$tmpip}[0])) : 80 :
/ADRR$/ ? $tmp_hv $tmpip1 [0] ? func_drr(split(As+l,$tmp_hv {$tmp_ip}[0])) :
80
/ADA ? $tmp_hv {$tmpip1} [0] ? func_da(Stmp_hv $tmpip}[0])

: 80 :

80;
$tmp_pt
try/ /,/;
return $tmp_pt;
}

# functions.
sub func_r {
my ($low,$high);
$low = defined $10] ? $10] : 20;
$high = defined $_[1] ? $_[1] : 29;
return int(rand($high-$low+1)) + $low;
}

sub func_r {
my ($low,$high);
$low = defined $_[0] ? $10] : 20;
$high = defined $_[1] ? $_[1] : 99;
my $temple = int(rand($high-$low+1)) + $ low;
my $templ = int(rand($high-$low+1)) + $low;
return ($temple < $templ ? "$temp2-$templ" : $temple > $templ ? "$temp2-$templ" :
$temple);
}

sub func dr {
my @temp = @_;
return $temp[int(rand(@temp))];
}

sub func_drr {
my $ratio = 0.5;
# default, 50% will be selected.
my $temple = "";
foreach my $templ (@_) {
if((rand) < $ratio) $temple .= ($templ. " "); }
}

# ($temple) ? chop($templ) : $temple=$_[$#_]; # why doesn't it work?
if($templ) chop($templ); }
# remove the last ,
# at least should get one.
else { $templ=$_[$#_]; }
return $temple;
}
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sub func_da {
return "@_";
}

# any other good method ?

(2) sce_cmd.conf
# This file specifies each attack program and its parameter format. The first
# column is the entry name. The second is the attack program name and the
# rest columns are its parameters. The sce_exp.p1 script reads an entry from
# the sce_exp.conf and will query this file to construct the command by
# finding the entries having same command name in two files.
# nmap port scan format:
source_port type
# entry cmd ip port delay
nmap_scan nmap - -p --scan_delay -g
-sNS
#1
syntcpn nmap - -sNS
#2
syntcpicmpn nmap - -sNS
#3
synicmpn nmap - -sNS
#4
syndontn nmap - -sNS
#5
syntcpi nmap - -sNS
#6
syntcpicmpi nmap - -sNS
#7
synicmpi nmap - -sNS

(3) sce_exp.conf
# This is the configuration file of scenario running program, sce_exp.pl.
# Each line stands for an attack with parameters except for the line beginning
# with # (it is a comment).
# There are three types of statement: attacks, waiting time between attack scenarios and
#running pre-scanning program to generate new pre_exp.data.
program_name <parameters>
# The format of attacks is:
# The format of time waiting is:
<n>s, <n>m, or <n>h
# The format of updating new database file is: newdata
# Example: format of port scan using nmap.
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delay source port type
# program target_addr services
# nmap DRIDRRIDAIva1ue RIRR/DRIDRRIva1ue R/value R/va1ue S/TIX/N
#nmap_scan DA R(3-5) 2000 1500 S [[-n..-P0]] {6-9} }
#nmapping_sweep DR R(1500-1600) P [[-n..-PS]] {4} }
#nmap_scan DRR R(1-5) 2000 1500 S [["aa"..bb]] {{2}}
#3.2s
#nmap_scan DR DR R(1000-2000) 1500 S {4} }
#1.2m
#newdata
# I added the stuff below
#1.0m
#netcatport DR DR
2s
#1
syntcpn 172.16.2.11 S [[-PT..-0..-T..0]] { {1} }
50s
#2
syntcpicmpn 172.16.2.12 S [[-PT..-PI..-O..-T..0]] { {2} }
55s
#3
synicmpn 172.16.2.13 S [[-PI..-O..-T..0]] { {5} }
100s
#4
syndontn 172.16.2.17 S
{ {7} }
80s
#5
syntcpi 172.16.2.12 S [[-PT..-0..-T..0]] { {5} }
51s
#6
syntcpicmpi 172.16.2.13 S [[-PT..-PI..-O..-T..0]] { {2} }
55s
#7
synicmpi 172.16.2.17 S [[-PI..-0..-T..0]] {5}}
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APPENDIX H

In this Appendix, a part of the stealth attacks configuration file is given.
Sce_exp.conf
# This is the configuration file of scenario running program, sce_exp.pl.
# Each line stands for an attack with parameters except for the line beginning
# with # (it is a comment).
#1
syntcpn 172.16.2.11 S [[-PT..-O..-T..0]] { {1} }
50s
#2
syntcpicmpn 172.16.2.12 S [[-PT..-PI..-0..-T..0]] { {2} }
55s
#3
synicmpn 172.16.2.13 S [[-PI..-0..-T..0]] { {5} }
100s
#4
syndontn 172.16.2.17 S [[-P0..-0..-T..0]] { {7} }
80s
#5
syntcpi 172.16.2.12 S [ -PT..-O. -T. 0] {{A})
51s
#6
syntcpicmpi 172.16.2.13 S [[-PT..-PI..-0..-T..0]] { {2} }
55s
#7
synicmpi 172.16.2.17 S [[-PI..-0..-T..0]] { {5} }
100s
#8
syndonti 172.16.2.18 S [[-P0..-0..-T..0]] { {7} }
130s
#9
syntcpid 172.16.2.13 S [[-PT..-n..-T..0]] { {3} }
71s
#10
syntcpicmpid 172.16.2.17 S [[-PT..-Pn..-O..-T..O]] { {2} }
65s
#11
synicmpid 172.16.2.18 S [[-PI..-n..-T..0]] { {5} }
110s
#12
syndontid 172.16.2.11 S [[-P0..-n..-T..0]] {{7} )
etc.
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